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« The ongoing debate over the foreign aid regime remains 
trapped in something of an intellectual vacuum given the 
lack of scholarly understanding of the determinants of 
foreign aid programs ». 




Lumsdaine (1993) and Noël and Thérien (1995) argue that socialist welfare states 
give more foreign aid than other types of welfare states. Socialist welfare states are 
seen as institutionalised values of distributive justice. But as institutions, they also 
said to re-transmit these values and have a conditioning effect on policy makers and 
public opinion. This paper tests these hypotheses with pooled cross-sectional time-
series analysis based on new dataset that was previously unavailable. The analysis in 
this paper casts doubts over their original findings and theoretical framework. 
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Résumé   
Les études menées par Lumsdaine (1993) et Noël et Thérien (1995) montrent que les 
États-providence socialistes fournissent plus d'aide publique au développement que 
les autres types d'État-providence. Les États-providence sont généralement considérés 
comme l'institutionnalisation des valeurs de la justice distributive. Mais en tant 
qu'institutions, ils sont également sensés transmettre ces valeurs et influencer les 
dirigeant politiques et l'opinion publique. Cet article met à l'épreuve cette hypothèse 
grâce à une analyse de régression qui s'appuie sur une nouvelle base de données, 
indisponible jusqu'à ce jour. Cette analyse remet en question les résultats et le cadre 
théorique de Lumsdaine et Noël et Thérien. 
 
Mots-clés  








This is a study of comparative politics. It looks at the determinants of foreign aid in a 
cross-national perspective. It covers the second half of the post World War II era, 
from 1970-1980 to 2005. It joins insights from the study of international relations, 
socio-economics, democratic theory and the study of public opinion. The main 
question in this study is this: do socialist welfare states give more foreign aid than 
others by conditioning public opinion?  
 
Knowledge about the determinants of foreign aid levels is important in the light of 
persisting, deep, global poverty. More than half of the world’s people live on less than 
2$ per day, purchasing power parity. Many of them do not have access to clean 
drinking water, good healthcare or schools for their children, let alone gaming 
consoles and haute couture fashion. From a scholarly perspective, the main question 
of this paper is interesting and compelling. In an abundant foreign aid literature, the 
question of the determinants of foreign aid is only sparsely addressed and no 
satisfactory answer exists for why some countries give more foreign aid than others. 
 
This study builds further on the existing literature with the revision and elaboration of 
theory and the analysis of a large dataset with previously unavailable data. In the 
theoretical section, literature on this subject is reviewed and existing explanations for 
the variation in foreign aid levels are presented. Based on this literature, two 
hypotheses about the causes of foreign aid are formulated. 
 
The first hypothesis is that universalist welfare state institutions create public support 
for foreign aid. The second hypothesis is that strong support for foreign aid increases 
foreign aid levels. When hypothesis one and two are true, a third hypothesis can be 
derived, linking universalist welfare states to higher foreign aid. In the empirical 
section of this paper, these hypotheses are tested with a large, multi-year dataset for 
approximately 18 countries.  
 
Literature review 
The literature on foreign aid can be divided into three fields. First, a vast literature 
exists about the effects of foreign aid (see for example Masud and Yontcheva 2005; 
Rajan and Subramanian 2005), but a simple answer to the question: “does aid work?” 
seems hard to give. Part of the reason for this has been a severe lack of focus on 
development results. Both governments, multilateral institutions and NGOs have 
failed to account for the results of their aid efforts. Much is known on inputs, but little 
is known about outcomes and long-term effects. The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) are steps forward for 
both donors and recipients to look better and more systematically at the concrete 
results of development efforts. 
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 The second field in the literature on foreign aid looks at the allocation or distribution 
of foreign aid budgets. Paraphrasing the title of a recent study (Alesina and Dollar 
2000), the following question is asked: “who gives foreign aid to whom and why?” 
The object of inquiry in these studies is how donors distribute their funds. Do former 
colonies, the poorest countries, strategic allies or others receive the largest share of 
their foreign assistance? The independent variables in these models are aspects of 
recipient states. Recent studies assessed whether recipient needs (Trumbull and Wall 
1994; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006) or 
recipients’ respect for human rights and democracy  are the main determinants for aid 
allocation. Other studies have compared French , or Japanese aid allocation in detail .  
 
Most of these studies also seek to answer the question whether foreign aid is 
motivated by self-interest or humanitarian concerns . Pratt  calls this opposition 
“international realism” versus “humane internationalism”.  
 
In an international political realist perspective, states are primarily driven by the desire 
for military and economic power. In the neo-realist framework, foreign policy is not 
the result of internal power struggle and policy formulation, but a reaction to systemic 
features of the external state system . For Morgenthau  for example, much of foreign 
aid “is in the nature of bribes”. Morgenthau then criticises foreign aid as a highly 
inefficient form of buying political influence, since a pervasive system of ‘make 
believe’ is required to make believe that economic development is really pursued. In a 
pure realist perspective, there is no possibility of people in power striving for the ideal 
of economic development of underdeveloped states.  
 
In contrast, the liberal idealist or Wilsonian position claims that states can (or even 
should) make their internal philosophy the goal of their foreign policy. This is deemed 
utopian by early realist thinkers, who denote attempts in this domain as a 
misunderstanding of the underlying conflicts of interest . In contrast to realism, the 
liberal position sees internal forces as the main origins of foreign policy. In this 
tradition, explanations for variations in relative levels of foreign aid are found inside 
the states in question, in the groups, parties and institutions of that state. The third 
field of literature on foreign aid inherently takes this position. 
 
The third and smallest field of the foreign aid literature looks at the determinants of 
foreign aid and compares donor aid effort. Why do some donors give more aid than 
others? The main object of inquiry in these studies is the level of foreign aid in donor 
countries. These studies look at aspects of donor states rather than aspects of recipient 
states. Several studies have hypothesised and (partly) shown that domestic welfare 
state generosity correlates positively with relative levels of foreign aid . However, 
Imbeau  notes that institutional inertia is the main explanation for aid levels, a finding 
that is confirmed by Breuning and Ishiyama  for the dispersion of aid. The most 





aid finds “no evidence of an association between the generosity ratio [ODA/GDP]1 
and domestic pro-poor government spending, or that right-wing governments are more 
parsimonious than left-wing ones” .2 These results contrast with the results found by 
Noël and Thérien, Lumsdaine and others. These contrasting results call for a closer 
look at this issue. In the following section, the rationale behind the link between 
welfare state generosity and ODA is examined in more detail. 
 
Socialist welfare states and higher foreign aid spending 
Lumsdaine  provides the most detailed rationale for the link between domestic and 
international concerns for poverty. He argues that 1) foreign aid was largely a product 
of humanitarian ideas and values and that 2) these ideas and values found support in 
the domestic political arrangements and religious and moral traditions of the West. 
These ideas and values “issued an emphasis on international cooperation and a 
commitment to remedying poverty for humanitarian and egalitarian reasons” . In 
Lumsdaine’s theoretical framework, the level of foreign aid of a country is a function 
of the level of concern for poverty in that country.  
 
Lumsdaine argues that at the domestic level, the concern for alleviating and reducing 
poverty, combined with the social and political dynamics of society, leads to social 
spending. At the international level, the concern for poverty combined with the 
dynamics of international power and organisation leads to foreign aid. Lumsdaine 
provides evidence that states with social-democratic traditions and strong support for 
domestic government assistance to poor people are more willing to provide foreign 
aid.  
 
Lumsdaine’s data analysis shows that domestic social spending, social democratic 
party strength, public support and private voluntary contributions to international 
economic assistance all correlate with higher foreign aid levels. He also links the rise 
of the welfare state and its roots of support in domestic movements (humanitarian, 
labour and social democratic) to the rise of foreign aid. This effect of the welfare state 
on foreign aid is examined in closer detail by Noël and Thérien . 
 
Noël and Thérien’s  theoretical framework is similar to Lumsdaine’s. Noël and 
Thérien agree that “aid and welfare state policies express the same values”  and they 
also understand these programs as “expressions of social values embedded in specific 
political institutions” . Noël and Thérien remark that “welfare programs cannot be 
reduced to a single spending or partisan logic and instead must be seen as lasting 
outcomes of social and political conflicts over distributive justice” . This explains 
                                                 
1 See appendix for a full definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
2 The authors operationalise pro-poor spending as “the share of government expenditure on subsidies 
and transfers in relation to total government spending”. They also proxy the totality of pro-poor stance 
by “the extent of income distribution egalitarianism that prevails in the donor country”. This totality of 
pro-poor stance is operationalised as “the share of income accruing to [the] poorest 20 per cent of the 
population” and alternatively by the Gini coefficient of income distribution. 
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their focus on institutional aspects of the welfare state, where other authors mainly 
looked at spending and partisan orientations.  
 
Noël and Thérien compare the effect of social spending and partisan orientation and 
find no significant effect for partisan orientation on relative ODA levels.1 However, 
they do find a significant effect for total and social spending from 1975 and 1980 
onwards respectively.2 They then use Esping-Andersen’s welfare state attributes  to 
assess the effect of welfare state institutions. They show that socialist welfare state 
attributes correlate strongly with aid levels, while liberal and conservative attributes 
do not. The rationale for this effect is that welfare states are “designed according to 
particular principles that were imposed though decisive conflicts over market and 
political processes” .  
 
According to Esping-Andersen, conflicts over market and political processes were 
resolved into three types of welfare states; a conservative, a liberal and a social-
democratic regime. Noël and Thérien find no effect for liberal and conservative 
welfare states, but do find that the socialist attribute correlates strongly with ODA 
levels. The social value embedded in the social-democratic welfare state is 
universality: “social democratic welfare programs are seen less as complementary 
measures targeted toward selected groups than as embodiments of a shared conception 
of citizenship” . Noël and Thérien claim that the presence of exactly this value causes 
higher foreign aid levels: “institutionalised principles such as universality function as 
causal mechanisms and help explain why welfare states act predictably in the 
international arena. Better than partisan dynamics, or public opinion, such principles 
capture fundamental aspects of a country’s politics. As such, they provide useful 
insights to link domestic and international behaviour” .  
 
Noël and Thérien do not claim that institutions can explain fully a country’s evolution. 
They say that “major changes are likely to require partisan and collective actions 
aimed at transforming established values and principles” . But when principles such as 
universality “prevail” and become institutionalised, they function as “causal 
mechanisms” . A similar argument is found in Hofstede , who argues that once culture 
is partly institutionalised, it means that young people exposed to these institutions will 
embrace parts of it. Institutional effects (on elites) have also been observed by 
Rohrschneider  in the case of East and West Germany.  
 
In reference to Cox , Noël and Thérien claim that “institutional factors capture the 
sociological dimension of political processes because they reproduce what, in a given 
society, stands as the legitimate or hegemonic consensus”. Scharpf argues analogously 
                                                 
1 Using data from Blais et al.  
2 Pearson’s r > 0.5 in all cases. Total spending are “total current disbursements” in OECD national 
accounts (percentages of GNP). Social transfers combines “social security benefits” and “social 




and writes that “although institutions do not determine public policy, they shape actor 
constellations, actor preferences and the modes of interaction between actors”.  
 
Both Lumsdaine and Noël and Thérien argue that concerns for poverty are the root 
cause of foreign aid programmes. Lumsdaine sees this concern transmitted into policy 
through policymaker beliefs, socio-political- and international organisation, and the 
rise of the welfare state. Noël and Thérien argue that values and principles of 
(distributive) justice institutionalised in the social democratic welfare state function as 
causal mechanisms that influence policy through public opinion. Based on this 
literature the following hypothesis is formulated:  
 
Hypothesis 0: universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions lead to higher foreign 
aid spending1 
 
Socialist welfare states and higher support for foreign aid 
In their 1995 article, Nöel and Thérien make a first reference to the influence of 
institutionalised values and principles on public attitudes . In Noël and Thérien , the 
same authors examine more explicitly the link between welfare policies and public 
opinion on foreign aid.  
 
They conclude, based on their earlier article and other studies, that principles 
institutionalized through social policies shape what political actors ‘consider to be 
morally defensible behaviour’. This implies that in countries with social-democratic 
traditions the public should value equality more strongly and be more sensitive to 
international redistribution . Their data analysis, based on aggregate Eurobarometer 
(1995) responses, shows that “when equality has been institutionalized as an important 
principle, the public acknowledges the results and support for foreign aid is high” .  
 
For Noël and Thérien, values and principles capture fundamental aspects of a 
country's domestic politics . They argue that the way conceptions of justice are 
institutionalised in welfare states influence differently “internal debates and decisions” 
about foreign policy and development assistance. As a result, “public opinion is 
strongly mediated by the constraints and opportunities provided by institutionalised 
values and principles” . This leads to the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions lead to higher public 
support for foreign aid  
 
Higher support for foreign aid and higher foreign aid spending 
Lumsdaine’s data analysis leads him to conclude that high public support (partly) 
causes high foreign aid levels: “comparisons of aid funding levels and opinion data 
                                                 
1 This hypothesis is called hypothesis 0 (not to be confused with the null hypothesis) for it is the basic 
hypothesis underlying the other two hypotheses elaborated in the following sections.  
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here suggest that the public’s concerns about poverty played a part in the link. 
Countries with high levels of public support for foreign aid tended to give more aid, 
and were more disposed to raise the level and quality of aid spending and keep it 
high” . The rationale for this effect is that the public’s preference is transformed into 
policy through democratic processes. By definition, democracy implies at least some 
sort of relationship between public opinion and government policy . 
  
Theorists disagree about the degree of influence from public opinion. Elitist 
democratic theory, found in the work of Schumpeter or Weber , sees democracy as the 
election of representative officials, who are then autonomous in their decision making 
and not sensible to public pressures. On the other hand, pluralist democratic theory as 
developed by Dahl and others  takes account of ‘intermediary groups’ in the 
democratic process, such as community associations, religious bodies, trade unions, 
and so forth. These groups struggle for influence and power and seek to set and 
change the policy agenda. In pluralist theory, it is these groups that transform public 
opinion into policy. Extensive networks of NGO’s, church groups and other civil 
organisations are active in the field of international solidarity and development. Their 
influence varies per country, but many are integrated in the policy process through 
lobbying, petitioning and consultation procedures. Apart from electoral pressure and 
partisan politics, it is through these organisations that public opinion is aggregated to 
influence decision makers  
 
Whether the view of democracy is elitist, pluralist or a combination of the two is 
decisive for the hypothesis of an effect of public opinion on policy.  Here, the 
possibility of an absence of an effect is left open, but the possibility of its presence is 
tested with the following hypothesis: 
 




The research design, based on the theory and hypotheses described above, is 
summarised in figure 1. Models 0, 1 and 2 correspond to hypotheses 0, 1 and 2 
respectively. Hypothesis 1 posits that universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions 
lead to higher public support for foreign aid. The plus sign indicates a positive 
relationship. Hypothesis 2 posits that higher public support for foreign aid leads to 
high foreign aid spending. Hypothesis 0 posits that universalist (socialist) welfare state 
institutions lead to higher foreign aid spending.  
 
Model 0 can be deduced from models 1 and 2 as follows. In causal analysis, the 
relationships of model 1 and 2 are multiplicative. If both signs of model 1 and 2 are 
positive or negative, then model 0 will have a positive sign. The hypotheses are such 
that the positive relations of models 1 and 2 predict that model 0 will have a positive 





positive, the resulting sign of model 0 is negative.1 This latter result would be in 




In this section the hypotheses are empirically tested. First, Noël and Thérien’s cross-
sectional analysis of model 0 is tested with additional welfare state indicators. Then, a 
cross-sectional time-series analysis of model 0 is presented to evaluate the robustness 
over time of the cross-sectional analysis. The methodology of this analysis is first 
explained and any variables not present in the cross-sectional model are described. 
Then, a cross-sectional time-series analysis of model 1 is presented. As before, any 
variables not present in the previous model are described. Finally, a cross-sectional 
time-series analysis of model 2 is presented.  The analysis of each model is followed 
by a conclusion. Summary statistics of all the variables used can be found in the 
appendix. 
 
Welfare States and Foreign Aid (Model 0) - Cross-Sectional analysis 
Noël and Thérien  have shown with cross-sectional regression analysis that socialist 
welfare state attributes  have a positive effect on the level of foreign aid. In this 
section their analysis is complemented with additional welfare state indicators.  
 
The dependent variable is foreign aid. It is operationalised as official development 
assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI.2 In the results tables this variable is called 
ODAP. ODA statistics are kept by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Relative rather than absolute ODA levels are examined to 
assess the generosity of states relative to income. ODA data are available for 22 
countries.3 The data ranges between 1960-2005. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Formally, let the three boxes of figure 2 be called X, Y and Z. The causal relationships are then 
represented by b, with in subscript the dependent and independent variable. Then, Model 0 = bZX, 
Model 1 = bYX and Model 2 = bZY. Model 0 = Model 1 * Model 2, or bZX = bYX * bZY.
2 See the appendix for a full definition of ODA. 
3 There are many references to ‘18’ or ’22’ countries in this paper. In the appendix there is a list of 
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The main independent variable is socialist welfare state attributes. Esping-Andersen’s 
original data and a replicated data set are used. To complement this single indicator, 
three other indices are used. These indices do not match the ‘socialist world’ perfectly, 
but arguably the postulated effect from socialist welfare state institutions on public 
opinion and foreign aid should also be present with these alternative indices. The 
variables are the following: 
 
Socialist Welfare State Attributes  
 EASOC. Esping-Andersen socialist welfare state attributes . Data are available for 
18 countries for 1980. 
 EASOCREP. Replicated Esping-Andersen socialist welfare state attributes . Data 
are available for 18 countries for 1980 and 2002. 
Socialist scores represent one of the three dimensions of the Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, the seminal work by Esping-Andersen . The socialist model is defined in 
terms of universalism. A lower level of benefit differentials indicates higher 
universalism. Program universalism is measured as a percentage of the adult 
population eligible for sickness, unemployment and pension benefits, and the degree 
of equality in the benefit structure (universalism and egalitarian benefits) . The 
available data come from Esping-Andersen  for 1980. Scuggs and Allen have 
replicated the scores for 1980 and 2002 based on public data sources .1 
 
Progressive Liberalism 
 HKPLFULL. Hicks Kenworthy full progressive liberalism . Data are available for 
18 countries for approximately 1990.  
The progressive liberalism thesis is developed by Hicks and Kenworthy . It builds on 
Esping-Andersen’s three worlds thesis, but also incorporates labour market and family 
policy. Their results lead them to believe that ‘socialism’ and ‘liberalism’ have 
become two extremes of one dimension rather than two separate categories. The 
former ‘socialist’ (or social democratic) category is represented on one end of an axis 
and is called ‘progressive liberalism’. The former ‘liberal’ category is on the other end 
and is called ‘neoliberalism’ . The third world of welfare, “conservatism”, is viewed 
as a second, but weaker dimension, representing “residual power out of the pre-
capitalist past”. The full analysis, “a thorough coverage of relevant aspects of welfare 
policies, uncompromised by concerns that measures might be so comprehensive as to 
incorporate some things that we would like them to predict”  is used.  
 
Decommodification 
 LSGENROS. Lyle Scruggs benefit generosity index (replicated 
decommodification scores with author’s preferred methodology) . Data are 
available for 18 countries. Data ranges from 1971 to 2003. 
                                                 
1 The original data used by Esping Andersen are not public. Scrugg and Allen have followed the 
original methodology using comparable public data sources so that others can reproduce their results. 
They found rather large discrepancies with the original 1980 socialist scores. A discussion of these 




Decommodification is the granting of social labour rights: “if social rights are given 
the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are 
granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a 
decommodification of the status of individuals vis-a-vis the market. 
Decommodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a 
person can maintain a likelihood without reliance on market. Decommodification is 
not solely captured by social expenditure levels, but also looks at eligibility rules and 
structures, income replacement levels and the range of entitlements . 
 
Countries with high decommodification scores have generous welfare states. Although 
welfare state generosity is not the same as welfare state universalism, the effect on 
public perceptions and foreign aid can be expected to be the same. The 
decommodification index measures the granting of social labour rights in terms of 
pensions, unemployment and sick pay. In the theoretical framework described above, 
the level of generosity should be felt by citizens, and should lead them to support 
generosity towards others (including poor people abroad) the same way universalist 
welfare states do. 
 
Social spending 
 SOCX. Social expenditures SOCX . Data are available for 22 countries. Data 
ranges from 1980 to 2003. 
The SOCX database contains indicators for aggregate social expenditure. The main 
social policy areas are old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, 
active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing, and ‘other social policy 
areas’.1 Social spending shows how much a country spends on social programmes, but 
tells little about the effects on individual life chance. Nevertheless, it is an interesting 
variable to include because it gives as an overall image of a country’s social 
programmes. An additional advantage is that the data is from a reliable source and 
available for a long range of years.  
 
Several control variables are added that influence both dependent and independent 
variables. Omitting these variables can lead to omitted variable bias  leading to 
incorrect estimates of causal effects. The following control variables are therefore 
added:  
 
Left Cumulative Cabinet Shares 
 LTCABCUM. Left Cumulative Cabinet Shares . Data are available for 18 
countries. Data ranges from 1960-2000 
Left Cumulative Cabinet Shares are left seats as a percentage of seats held by all 
government parties from 1946 to the year of observation. Thérien and Noël  have 
                                                 
1 http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,2340,en_2649_34635_31612994_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed on 
12-07-2007. 
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shown that leftist power has an effect on both foreign aid and socialist welfare state 
attributes. 
 LPOP. Logged Population (OECD). Data are available for 22 countries. Data 
ranges from 1960-2005 
Logged population is the natural log of the population in thousands. Small countries 
spend more on relative foreign aid and have larger welfare states. Because a well-
grounded theory for this is not available, this is treated as an observed fact . 
 LGDP. Logged GDP (OECD). Data are available for 18 countries. Data ranges 
from 1970-2000. 
Logged GDP is the natural log of the Gross Domestic Product. This variable is added 
for the same reason as population. 
  
Tables 1 and 2 show the cross-sectional OLS regression results for 1980 and 2000. In 
each model ODA as % GNI (ODAP) is the dependent variable. For each cross-
section, the available operationalisations of welfare generosity for that period were 
used. All 1980 results are robust and maintain their strength under various alterations.1 
 
Table 1 - Model 0 regression results (OLS regression) with independent variables 
for 1980 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Dependent F.odap F.odap F.odap F.odap 
easoc 0.098    
 (3.26)***    
easocrep  0.044   
  (1.47)   
lsgenros   0.032  
   (3.62)***  
socx    0.022 
    (1.66) 
ltcabcum 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.009 
 (0.17) (1.68) (0.20) (1.10) 
lpop 0.066 0.024 0.065 0.006 
 (1.48) (0.46) (1.53) (0.11) 
lgdp 0.007 0.198 -0.260 0.217 
 (0.02) (0.56) (0.88) (0.62) 
Constant -0.651 -1.911 1.316 -2.099 
 (0.26) (0.60) (0.52) (0.67) 
Observations 18 18 18 18 
                                                 
1 For 1980 models, single year ODA data was replaced with 5 and 10 year ODA averages. All 
significances hold for these models. Adjusted R-squares rise with 0.03 points for 5 year averages and 
0.06 points for 10 year averages. The models were also ran without either lpop or lgdp to check for 
problems due to limited degrees of freedom. For models without lpop, all significances hold, but easoc 
drops from the 1% level to the 5% level. Adjusted R-squares drop 0.03 points for models with 
significant welfare state variables, but rise 0.03 points for models without significant welfare state 
variables. For models without lgdp, all significances hold and adjusted R-squares remain roughly the 




 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.27 0.57 0.29 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at  1% 
 
The explanatory power of Esping-Andersen’s original 1980 socialist scores is 
confirmed by the results in table 1. However, the replicated socialist scores do not 
perform as well as expected. This can be explained by Allan and Scruggs’ remark that 
Esping-Andersen used inconsistent coding for socialist scores. Furthermore, Scruggs 
and Allen note that universalism in the 1980s was higher for most countries than 
suggested by Esping-Andersen. In two countries the estimates are noticeably lower 
(Australia and Canada). Scruggs and Allen’s data further suggest much more equality 
in many countries and less variability than suggested in the original data. If Scruggs 
and Allen are right about the incorrectness of Esping-Andersen’s original socialist 
scores, this invalidates the empirical results of Noël and Thérien. However, it does not 
necessarily invalidate their theory. More equality and less variability across countries 
in the estimates makes the socialist scores less suitable indicators to demonstrate the 
theorised effect. 
 
Decommodification shows up as a good explanation for relative ODA levels. The 
adjusted R2 is even higher than for the original socialist scores. Social expenditures 
(SOCX) do not seem to have an effect on foreign aid levels. This could be explained 
by the ‘roughness’ of social expenditures. Social expenditures per se do not tell much 
about the effects on individuals or households. High social expenditures that are 
distributed on a corporatist basis do not yield the feeling of solidarity, equality and 
security that universalist welfare states or high decommodification scores are 
presumed to yield. 
 
The results for the year 2000 regression models are shown in table 2.1 These models 
are robust and maintain their strength under various alterations.2 
 
                                                 
1 Even though easoc02 is based on data for 2002, 2000 was used as the year for the other independent 
variables and 2001 as the year for the dependent. Formally this is a no-go, since past values are 
predicted with future values. However, many of the variable only go up to the year 2000, leading to a 
practical problem. This decision is justified with the fact that welfare institutions are known to be stable 
over time. It is therefore assumed that the socialist scores for 2002 are the same as for 2000. 
2 For 2000 models, single year ODA data is replaced with 5 year ODA averages (10 year averages are 
only available with forecasted values). All significances hold for these models. Hkplfull becomes 
significant at the 5% level. Adjusted R-squares rise 0.01-0.03 points. The models were also run without 
either lpop or lgdp to check for problems due to limited degrees of freedom. For models without lpop, 
all significances hold, and hkplfull rises from the 10% level to the 5% level. Adjusted R-squares rise 
0,01-0.03 points. Ltcabcum becomes significant at the 5% level for model d. For models without lgdp, 
all significances hold and hkplfull rises from the 10% level to the 5% level. Adjusted R-squares drop 
0.01 to 0.04 points.  
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Table 2 - Model 0 regression results (OLS regression) with independent variables 
for 2000 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Dependent F.odap F.odap F.odap F.odap 
easoc02 0.062    
 (3.31)***    
hkplfull  0.172   
  (2.11)*   
lsgenros   0.022  
   (2.59)**  
socx    0.009 
    (0.50) 
ltcabcum 0.010 0.001 0.005 0.008 
 (2.77)** (0.09) (1.09) (1.03) 
lpop 0.002 -0.031 -0.015 -0.052 
 (0.07) (0.77) (0.39) (1.00) 
lgdp 0.519 0.404 0.272 0.583 
 (1.71) (1.13) (0.79) (1.30) 
Constant -5.361 -3.436 -2.933 -5.382 
 (1.73) (0.94) (0.85) (1.17) 
Observations 18 18 18 18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.55 0.60 0.40 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The replicated socialist scores for 2002 provide good explanatory leverage. This is a 
puzzling result, as Scruggs and Allen note that compared to the 1980 replicated 
estimates, these scores show “similarly discordant results” as the replicated 1980 
scores . There are two possible inferences from this. One is that Scruggs and Allen’s 
results are flawed. Further examination of their analysis should show whether this is 
the case. Another is that ODA levels have aligned more to the stratification as 
demonstrated for 2002. However, why this would be so cannot be explained by the 
social stratification data itself. 
 
Progressive liberalism has a significant and positive result on ODA levels, but only at 
the 10% level. However, for each year from 1991 to 1999, the significance level is 
below the 5% level (results not shown). The progressive liberalism index is based 
upon data from around 1990. During the 1990s, mean ODA as % of GNI for the 18 
country dataset dropped faster than ever before in the history of ODA (from .50 in 
1991 to .39 in 2000). Because the progressive liberalism index has one only fixed data 
point, it cannot account for this dynamic.1 
 
                                                 
1 The mean ODA level does not reveal any country specific effects. However, it can be used as an 
indication of evolving trends. More detailed analysis should point out if the drop of the mean is 




As for the 1980 model, decommodification provides a statistically significant 
explanation for ODA levels of the year 2000. The drop in mean ODA during the 
1990s is accompanied by a drop in mean decommodification. Decommodification did 
not drop at the same rate as ODA, but decommodification manages to remain 
significant at the 5% level. Probably for the same reason as mentioned above, social 
expenditures do not exhibit any explanatory leverage for the year 2000 model.  
 
Conclusion 
The original Esping-Andersen socialist scores confirm the effect on ODA. However, 
the replicated scores by Scruggs and Allen yield mixed results. They show no effect 
for 1980, but show a strong effect for 2002. It is difficult to take sides on which data 
shows the ‘real’ picture. Until the replicated data are more thoroughly analysed, it is 
difficult to determine whether universalist welfare state institutions have an effect on 
foreign aid or not. The Hicks and Kenworthy progressive liberalism scores provide 
good explanations of ODA levels in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the single year index 
provides too little information to predict ODA values for longer data ranges. 
 
Social expenditures do not yield much information about ODA levels in cross-
sectional analysis. A time-series analysis should point out whether this crude measure 
of welfare policies has any explanatory power over longer periods of time. 
Decommodification provides the best explanation of ODA levels. It performs well in 
both 1980 and 2000 models. This effect is consistent with the theory that universalist 
(socialist) welfare state institutions lead to higher foreign aid spending. These mixed 
results warrant a further analysis of the data. In the following section a pooled cross-
sectional time-series analysis with the available data is presented of model 0. 
  
Welfare States and Foreign Aid (Model 0) - Time-Series analysis 
The majority of the operationalisations of welfare state generosity are only available 
for cross-sections. But two of the operationalisations are available for a series of years 
(LSGENROS and SOCX). Since the dependent variable and the control variables are 
also available for the same series of years, a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
analysis can be performed. The advantage of this method of analysis is that it 
increases the number of observations.1 With only 18 countries under investigation, 
cross-sectional analysis offers only limited degrees of freedom (n-1). This limits the 
number of control variables that can be added in each analysis, increasing the risk of 
omitted variable bias. Another advantage is that it can account for changes over time. 




Only two of the operationalisations of welfare state generosity are available for a 
series of years: decommodification and social expenditures. The control variables are 
                                                 
1 For the difference between a case and an observation, see  
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available for all time periods. Variable descriptions and available years are mentioned 
in the section(s) above. Given the sizable increase in degrees of freedom some 
additional control variables are added. Country dummies to control for country 
specific effects and year dummies to control for time specific effects (such as 
particularities of the ‘zeitgeist’ that cannot be modelled). The year dummies are 
omitted in some models to show the influence of time effects on the outcome of the 
regression. Joint significance of country and year dummies was tested with a Wald 
test (Stata command for this test is -testparm-). 
 
The following control variables were added: 
 GDPGR. Growth of real GDP .  
 LGDPPC. The natural log of GDP per capita. This is GDP divided by population. 
 ST_UNEM. Standardised unemployment rates .  
 
Tests 
An issue with time-series data is non-stationarity. Stationary time-series exhibit a 
clear-cut tendency to return to a constant value or a given trend. This is a requirement 
for the estimation of linear models. The presence of a ‘unit root’ indicates that time-
series are not stationary . When a unit root is present, the problem of non-stationarity 
can be dealt with by taking the first differences of the dependent and key independent 
variables rather than their absolute values.  
 
Two tests of serial correlation are performed for all TSCS regression models.1 The 
results of the statistics can be found at the bottom of each regression output. The first 
test is a test of ‘serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data 
model’ discussed by Wooldridge . The Stata command for this test is –xtserial2-.2  
 
The second test is what Beck and Katz  call a ‘a simple Lagrange multiplier test’. The 
same test is referred to by Kittel  as a ‘Durbin m-test’. What this test does is regressing 
the residuals from an OLS estimation (Y) on the first lag of those residuals (X1) as 
well as all the independent variables (X2, …, Xn) used in the OLS estimation. The 
estimated coefficient of the lagged residual term yields an estimate of the remaining 
serial correlation of the errors. A test of the null hypothesis that this coefficient is zero 
is a test of the null hypothesis that the remaining errors are serially independent . No 
implementation for this test could be found in Stata. A Stata program called –
durbinm- was therefore written by the author that calculates this statistic. The ado file 
showing the exact operations is added in the appendix. 
 
                                                 
1 Other tests are available but gave problems with the dataset because either test only works for GLS 
models. One is a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier statistic that tests for contemporaneous correlation 
(-xttest2- in STATA) proposed by Greene . Another possibility is -xtcsd, pesaran-, based on Pesaran . 
This command tests for cross-sectional dependence.  





Remaining serial correlation causes OLS to underestimate the standard errors of the 
coefficients leading to larger t-statistics, overly optimistic p-values and the risk that 
the null hypothesis is mistakenly rejected. One way to remove serial correlation is 
through the addition of a lagged dependent variable. In case that after the inclusion of 
an Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) there is still remaining serial correlation, this is 
a serious problem. The estimates of an OLS regression can no longer be trusted, not 
even PCSE. But turning to a FGLS model has the same result, argue Beck and Katz. 
The best that can be done in this situation is to estimate both models (with LDV and 
FGLS) and compare the results. 
 
The test for groupwise heteroscedasticity is done with -xttest3-. This test calculates a 
modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of a fixed 
effect or FGLS regression model and follows Greene. It postulates: H0: 
homoskedasticity. Kittel and Winner  conclude that when the test is highly significant, 
"it seems reasonable to follow the recommendation by Beck and Katz  to apply panel 
corrected standard errors”.  
 
Two tests were used to check for non-stationarity in the dependent variable.1 The first 
is the -ipshin- test, based on Im, Pesaran and Shin . It postulates: H0: all time series 
are non-stationary. The results of the -ipshin- test is that the balanced dependent 
variable has p-values low enough to reject the null hypothesis.2 The second is the –
levinlin- command, based on Levin, Lin and Chu . The -levinlin- test allows to reject 
the null hypothesis with an even greater level of certainty.3 These tests warrants the 
conclusion that the dependent variable does not suffer from non-stationarity. As a 
result, we can abstain from using first difference methods. However, since unit root 
tests are infamous for their low power , robustness was checked by also adding first 




Table 3 - Model 0 Regression results (PCSE regression) with LSGENROS as main 
independent variable 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Dependent F.odap F.odap F.odap F.odap FD.odap FD.odap FD.odap FD.odap 
odap 0.720 0.740   -0.289 -0.284 -0.282 -0.274 
 (21.68)*** (22.67)***   (8.13)*** (7.42)*** (8.51)*** (7.81)*** 
FD.lsgenros     0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
     (1.88)* (1.91)* (2.11)** (2.17)** 
                                                 
1 Both unit root tests can only handle balanced panels. Since our panel is not balanced (some countries 
only started giving ODA later than 1960) countries were omitted for which data was not available for 
the full time period under analysis (1960-2005. 
2 The result of the-ipshin- test is significant at the 5% level for lags 1, 2 and 4. The result is significant 
at the 10% level for lag 3. 
3 The result of the –levinlin- test is significant at the 1% level for lags 1-4. 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
lsgenros -0.000 0.002 0.005 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.24) (1.85)* (2.61)*** (9.52)*** (0.50) (1.78)* (0.70) (2.10)** 
FD.ltcabcum     -0.007 -0.008   
     (0.88) (1.07)   
ltcabcum -0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.09) (1.56) (2.28)** (0.52) (0.64) (1.02) (0.68) (1.05) 
FD.lgdppc     -0.326 0.044 -0.342 0.003 
     (1.24) (0.25) (1.38) (0.02) 
lgdppc 0.067 0.006 0.363 0.043 0.047 0.016 0.040 0.009 
 (1.63) (0.84) (6.39)*** (3.38)*** (1.04) (1.68)* (0.93) (0.94) 
FD.st_ 
unemp     -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
     (0.92) (0.19) (0.96) (0.28) 
st_unemp -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (2.74)*** (5.22)*** (2.01)** (4.18)*** (2.48)** (2.96)*** (2.65)*** (3.02)*** 
FD.gdpgr     -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
     (0.25) (3.03)*** (0.21) (2.94)*** 
gdpgr 0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.007 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 (1.56) (0.75) (2.66)*** (3.39)*** (0.62) (1.01) (0.73) (0.94) 
FD.lpop     -0.607 -0.158 -0.611 -0.182 
     (2.13)** (0.77) (2.26)** (0.95) 
lpop -0.064 -0.171 -0.256 -0.730 -0.131 -0.216 -0.128 -0.209 
 (1.01) (4.04)*** (2.64)*** (14.49)*** (1.93)* (4.96)*** (2.00)** (5.12)*** 
Constant 0.837 1.755 3.218 7.278 1.457 2.192 1.411 2.108 
 (1.46) (4.22)*** (3.66)*** (14.70)*** (2.37)** (5.07)*** (2.45)** (5.21)*** 
Auto- 
correlation 1 
- F 95.118 63.369 44.481 34.303 81.558 53.807 84.630 53.943 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Auto- 
correlation 2 
- b -.19648 -.22324 .69506 .67481 -.21405 -.20754 -.21566 .21835 
P 0.006 0.0008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.002 
Hetero-
scedasticity - 
χ2 184.34 798.16 362.41 524.37 218.14 455.01 152.56 478.05 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country 
effects - χ2 80.81 64.01 1180.00 999.29 74.98 64.84 75.66 63.76 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time effects 
- χ2 105.06  114.34  89.31  94.80  
P 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Year 
Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Obser-
vations 420 420 420 420 384 384 402 402 
Number of 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
z statistics in 
parentheses        





Table 3 shows the PCSE regression results for Model 0 with LSGENROS as main 
independent variable. The dependent variable is ODAP. Models (a)-(d) are standard 
regressions. Models (a) and (b) have a LDV while models (c) and (d) do not. Models 
(b) and (d) have no year dummies. Models (e)-(h) are first difference regressions.1 
Models (e) and (f) take the first difference of LTCABCUM while models (g) and (h) 
only take the absolute values of LTCABCUM. Models (f) and (h) have no year 
dummies.  
 
Of main interest are the b-values and z-statistics of decommodification (lsgenros), the 
main independent variable. The b-value of decommodification is positive and 
statistically significant for all models except (a), (e) and (g). The first differences of 
decommodification (fd.lsgenros) are positive and statistically significant for all 
models in which they are included.  
 
For each model, we see that the z-statistic is higher for models without year dummies. 
The increased significance of decommodification in the absence of year dummies 
indicates that there are time-specific effects at work that are not modelled for. A 
hypothetical reason for this could be that development aid was more on the 
international agenda in some years than in others. At different moments in time, large 
humanitarian crises have demonstrated the need for foreign aid. This could have 
caused aid levels to rise. As other problems gained salience on the agenda, and interest 
for international development waned, aid levels might have dropped. Further research 
should point out whether this hypothesis is true or not. 
 
Models (a)-(d) 
The inclusion of a LDV does not seem to resolve the problem of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity (even after inclusion of a LDV, all three tests continue to reject the 
null hypothesis of ‘no autocorrelation / heteroscedasticity’). Even though this is a 
serious problem, there are no tools readily available to resolve this problem. It does 
permit however to consider the models without LDV as equally (in)valid as the 
models with LDV. The highly increased significance of decommodification in models 
(c) and (d) compared to models (a) and (b) can be explained by the absence of ODAP 
as LDV. As noted before, ODAP as LDV consumes almost 92% of the variation. The 
high significance (1% level) of decommodification in both models (c) and (d) seems 
to substantiate hypothesis 0 that universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions lead 
to higher foreign aid spending. 
 
Models (e)-(g) 
All the first difference models show statistically significant and positive b-values for 
the first difference of decommodification (fd.lsgenros). The values do not reach the 
                                                 
1 The ‘FD.’ prefix of a variable indicates that the first differences were taken. For independent 
variables, the ‘FD.’ version of a variable can be interpreted as a short term effect. The standard absolute 
values version of an independent variable can be interpreted as a long term effect. 
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highest level of significance, but are stable across models. This indicates a short term 
effect of decommodification on foreign aid levels. The absolute values of 
LSGENROS only have statistically significant and positive b-values in the absence of 
year dummies. Because the year dummies are jointly significant they should not be 
dropped. This indicates that for the first difference models, a long term effect of 
decommodification on foreign aid cannot be confirmed. 
 
These results are rather surprising, because one would sooner expect a long term than 
a short term effect from institutionalised values. The benefits of welfare institutions 
can be argued to need time to settle into peoples opinions. 
 
Additional remarks 
Population has the expected effect on foreign aid: the negative b-value indicates that 
larger countries give relatively less foreign aid. This effect is statistically significant 
across models. Standardised unemployment is highly significant and negative for all 
models. This effect could be expected with the logic that countries will first invest in 
their own economy to take care of national citizens before giving development aid to 
foreigners. The robustness of this effect across models is unexpected but interesting. 
Further research should look closer in to the exact workings of this mechanism. 
 
Conclusion 
Serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are a problem in all models.1 The inclusion of 
a lagged dependent variable does not resolve this problem. When we dismiss the 
results of the LDV models, both decommodification and social expenditures have a 
positive significant effect on foreign aid levels. But omitting the lagged dependent 
variable can only be justified when there is no theoretical reason to believe that last 
year’s level of ODA has anything to do with this year’s level of ODA . This is a 
precarious assumption. It is much more likely that ODA does indeed depend on 
previous levels. The institutional inertia of ODA has also been mentioned in earlier 
research.2 
 
Long term effects of either decommodification or social expenditures do not occur in 
first difference models. On the other hand, significant and positive short term effects 
are present for both decommodification and social expenditures. 
 
                                                 
1 A solution to the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity problem is the application of Prais-Winsten 
regression. The results are available upon request. Serial correlation is successfully removed with this 
technique (see the Durbin-Watson statistics). In the Prais-Winsten regressions, social expenditures do 
not have any significant effect in models (a) and (b), but do have a significant short and long term effect 
in all first difference models. In fact, the anticipated long term effect is more statistically significant 
than the short term effects. Here again, standardised unemployment is robust across models. The danger 
of overconfident confidence intervals in the case of Prais-Winsten regression should be kept in mind 
here. 




On the whole, the effect of social welfare institutions on foreign aid is not evident 
from these data. Yes, some models demonstrate a statistically significant and positive 
effect of either decommodification or social spending. But the models in which effects 
appear are never the most restricted or safest models. There is enough reason to 
continue to assess models 1 and 2, but the hypothesis that universalist (socialist) 
welfare state institutions lead to higher foreign aid spending is not incontestably 
proven by these results. 
 




Model 1 posits a positive relationship between egalitarian welfare states and public 
support for foreign aid. When welfare states are more egalitarian, public support for 
foreign aid should be higher. The data used for this analysis is described below. 
 
Data 
Internationally comparable multi-year public opinion data are scarce. The only source 
that has comparative questions on development aid over countries and time is 
Eurobarometer. One question in particular has been asked in (roughly) the same 
wording in (roughly) the same set of countries over a period of time. The big 
drawback of this data is that it is only available for European countries. This is a 
serious limitation, but there is no alternative. Many country-level surveys are held, but 
the formulation of the questions is always different across countries. Even on a single 
country level, it is virtually impossible to find continued surveys over a large number 
of years that use the same wording. The risk of invalid measurement (not measuring 
what you want to measure) is greater than the possible benefit of including this data. 
Until surveys are held at a OECD DAC level, this limitation remains a problem for 
this type of analysis. 
 
These are the public opinion variables that used for the analysis of model 1: 
 
 OPINION1 – Eurobarometer: “In your opinion, is it very important, important, not 
very important or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, 
Figure 2 Model 0
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Latin America, Asia, etc. to develop?”1 The data are available for 8 years, ranging 
from 1983 to 2004. 
 
There are approximately 70 observations (not all countries were part of the survey in 
all years) in the dataset. The categories ‘very important’ and ‘important’ were merged 
to form a category of people who find it important to help people in poor countries. 
This question is imperfect for a multitude of reasons. It does not distinguish between 
development aid and humanitarian aid. It does not ask whether people think it is their 
government that is responsible to do something. Neither does it ask why people think 
it is important to help. Short, this variable has serious shortcomings. But as noted 
above, this is the only tool available for comparative analysis, however bad it may be.  
 
To cope with the missing value problem, missing values are imputed in two ways. 
These imputation techniques are borrowed from Milner . 
 
 OPINION2 – OLS imputed missing values based on OPINION1. This procedure 
estimates an OLS regression line based on values of the available years. The 
missing years are filled with the estimated values of the regression equation for 
that country. Years for which data was available kept their original value. If a 
downward trend line led to negative values, these values were set to zero and cut 
off at that year. 
 
 OPINION3 – This procedure takes the value from the last year for which data was 
available in OPINION1. For example, the years between 1983 and 1987 (two 
years for which data were available) were filled with the 1983 data. The data range 
was extrapolated to the year 2006. 
 
The two procedures increase the number of cases for which data is available to 
approximately 190 observations.2 
 
The regressions below are PCSE regressions. First differences were not used for three 
reasons. First, the many gaps in the sample make it virtually impossible to perform 
unit root tests. Second, to take the first differences of the raw values (opinion1) is 
problematic, for the value of the previous period is ‘missing’ in most cases. Third, to 
take the first differences of the imputed values is risky because they do not represent 
‘real’ values.3 Lagged dependent variables could not be included due to gaps in the 
sample. 
 
                                                 
1 Full descriptions of the questions can be found in the appendix. The questions were not exactly similar 
for all years, but similar enough to treat them equivalently.  
2 data for Norway was not imputed beyond the latest available year since there were only two years for 
which data was available 
3 Prais-Winsten regressions were done to check the difference. Since the results conform to the PCSE 




Table 5 shows the PCSE regression results for Model 1 with decommodification 
(lsgenros) as main independent variable. The dependent variable is public support for 
foreign aid. 
 
Models (a) and (b) have the original Eurobarometer results as dependent variable. 
Models (c) and (d) have the missing values filled with OLS estimates (opinion2). 
Models (e) and (f) have the missing values filled with the values from the last 




Table 5 - Model 1 Regression results (PCSE regression) with LSGENROS as main 
independent variable 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Dependent F.opinion1 F.opinion1 F.opinion2 F.opinion2 F.opinion3 F.opinion3 
lsgenros -0.006 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 
 (2.33)** (4.93)*** (1.32) (1.50) (1.38) (2.98)*** 
ltcabcum -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 -0.036 
 (2.78)*** (2.15)** (2.48)** (1.05) (2.75)*** (5.40)*** 
lgdppc 0.312 0.328 0.239 0.256 0.329 0.702 
 (2.14)** (16.21)*** (1.76)* (12.12)*** (2.32)** (13.17)*** 
gdpgr 0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (1.11) (1.77)* (0.98) (0.65) (0.32) (0.63) 
st_unemp 0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.022 
 (0.70) (1.87)* (0.30) (1.58) (0.11) (7.02)*** 
lpop -0.142 -0.184 -0.094 -0.048 -0.036 -0.171 
 (0.99) (4.21)*** (0.85) (1.86)* (0.33) (4.63)*** 
Constant 1.730 2.189 1.336 1.781 0.197 4.013 
 (1.21) (6.33)*** (1.27) (4.88)*** (0.19) (7.21)*** 
Autocorrelation 1 - F1   4.769 4.166 204.758 969.093 
P   0.0515 0.066 0.000 0.000 
Autocorrelation 2 - b2   .1070 .0075 .4627 .0404 
P   0.172 0.921 0.000 0.148 
Heteroscedasticity - χ2 1.6e+06 76023.88 109.54 150.94 8781.92 18409.06 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country effects - χ2 151.49 108.60 865.31 555.44 317.08 142.92 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time effects - χ2 60.13  153.44  1652.43  
P 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Year dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 70 70 189 189 189 189 
Number of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
                                                 
1 This test was not performed for models (a) and (b) due to gaps in the sample.  
2 This test was not performed for models (a) and (b) due to gaps in the sample. 
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The b-value of decommodification is negative and statistically significant for models 
(a), (b) and (f). This indicates that the more social benefits workers receive, the less 
people are in favour of foreign aid. This result is in complete contrast with the 
theoretical framework. 
 
It should be noted that decommodification is only significant in model (f) due to the 
omission of year dummies. Since time effects are jointly significant in model (e), there 
is no good reason to omit these dummies. All models suffer from heteroscedasticity. 
Serial correlation is a problem for models (e) and (f). However, the fact that the most 
restricted model, with only original data and time dummies (model ‘a’) yields a 
significant negative effect from decommodification on public support for foreign aid 
is a surprising and important finding. 
 
Additional remarks 
Cumulative left power has a comparable effect on public support as 
decommodification. This finding is equally surprising. People in countries with strong 
left partisan traditions are expected to have higher support for foreign aid. GDP per 
capita does have the expected sign. The richer people are, the more they are expected 
to support helping poor people. Some cynics might argue the opposite, but to common 
sense this result is not surprising. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis suffers from some of the problems that were discussed before (serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity), but the results presented here are robust after 
correction of these problems.1 
Table 5 and table 6 (see appendix) show the remarkable result that decommodification 
and social spending have a statistically significant negative effect on public support 
for foreign aid. In other words, the more social benefits people receive, the less they 
support foreign aid. This result completely contradicts the theoretical framework. The 
hypothesis that universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions lead to higher public 
support for foreign aid can therefore not be accepted. 
 
Public Opinion and Foreign Aid (Model 2) - Time-Series analysis 
 
Methodology 
Hypothesis 2 posits that higher public support for foreign aid leads to higher foreign 
aid spending. This hypothesis is tested with the data described in the previous 
sections. In model 2, the dependent variable is ODA as % of GNI. The main 
independent variable is public support for foreign aid. The same public opinion 
                                                 





variables are used as in model 1. All models are PCSE regressions with a lagged 




Table 7 - Model 2 Regression results (PCSE regression with LDV) with Public 
Opinion as main independent variable 2 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Dependent F.odap F.odap F.odap F.odap F.odap F.odap 
odap 0.850 0.829 0.714 0.690 0.708 0.704 
 (11.05)*** (10.78)*** (13.04)*** (14.58)*** (12.60)*** (13.61)*** 
opinion1 0.203 0.053     
 (1.44) (0.95)     
opinion2   0.307 0.224   
   (2.46)** (3.95)***   
opinion3     0.023 -0.058 
     (0.26) (3.07)*** 
ltcabcum -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 
 (1.05) (1.47) (1.63) (1.16) (2.55)** (2.88)*** 
st_unemp 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.54) (1.07) (1.78)* (2.84)*** (1.59) (2.18)** 
lgdppc -0.067 -0.083 -0.088 -0.089 -0.015 0.011 
 (0.60) (1.82)* (1.47) (2.32)** (0.32) (0.35) 
gdpgr 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 
 (2.00)** (3.30)*** (2.28)** (1.65)* (2.36)** (1.79)* 
lpop 0.010 -0.035 -0.080 -0.070 -0.101 -0.075 
 (0.11) (0.45) (1.58) (1.75)* (2.45)** (2.22)** 
Constant -0.140 0.422 0.720 0.673 1.204 1.041 
 (0.15) (0.65) (1.11) (1.34) (2.62)*** (2.74)*** 
Autocorrelation 1 - F3   69.457 78.736 70.768 80.383 
P   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Autocorrelation 2 - b4   -.5031 -.5364 -.4867 -.4958 
P   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Heteroscedasticity - χ2 6266.47 2.3e+05 215.68 955.93 231.59 557.38 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country effects - χ2 25.22 28.28 53.44 51.85 55.26 56.54 
P 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time effects - χ2 14.67  30.72  24.29  
P 0.012  0.031  0.146  
Year dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
                                                 
1 Prais-Winsten regressions of the same models do not show significant effects for any of the public 
opinion variables. When the LDV is omitted, public support in model (b) becomes significant at the 
10% level and public support in model (f) loses all significance. All other significances hold. 
2 Model 2 is robust with lsgen or socx included as independent variable. 
3 This test could not be done for models (a) and (b) due to gaps in the sample.  
4 This test could not be done for models (a) and (b) due to gaps in the sample. 
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 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Observations 59 59 178 178 177 177 
Number of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Table 7 shows no significant effect on foreign aid from opinion1. Only when the LDV 
is omitted, the effect from public opinion in model (b) becomes significant at 10% and 
stays positive (results not shown). This step is not warranted, because the time 
dummies are jointly significant in model (a).  
 
Opinion2 shows a positive and significant effect at the 5% level with year dummies 
(model ‘c’) and when year dummies are omitted, a positive and significant effect at 
the 1% level (model ‘d’). At a standard level of alpha (5%), the choice to omit the 
year dummies is not warranted. The year dummies in model (c) are jointly significant. 
Omitting the LDV diminishes the significance of opinion in model (c) to 10%, but 
leaves intact the 1% level in model (d).  
 
Opinion3 does not show a significant effect with year dummies, but when the year 
dummies are omitted it shows a highly significant negative effect. This step is 
warranted by the joint insignificance of the year dummies in model (e). However, 
when the LDV is omitted for model (f), the effect stays negative but loses all 
significance (results not shown). 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the raw Eurobarometer data (opinion1), higher public support for foreign aid 
does not lead to higher foreign aid spending. When the missing values in the raw data 
are imputed with an OLS regression technique, public support for foreign aid has a 
fairly robust positive effect on foreign aid levels. When the missing values in the raw 
data are filled with the last known values, it is unclear what effect (if any) public 





The theoretical framework in this paper can be summarised as follows. 
Institutionalised values and principles of equality have a positive effect on foreign aid 
levels through the effect they have on public preferences. Once institutionalised, 
values and principles of equality are transmitted to those exposed to the institutions 
that embody them. The public preferences are aggregated back into (foreign) welfare 
policies through democratic processes. Figure 2 represents these causal processes. 
 
If all of the above is true, universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions lead to 




leads to higher foreign aid spending. As a consequence, universalist (socialist) 
welfare state institutions lead to higher foreign aid spending. These are the three 
hypotheses under examination in this paper. 
 
The last hypothesis (model 0) was scrutinised first. This analysis shows that the 
original effect, as found by Noël and Thérien  is more uncertain than previously 
assumed. The validity of the Esping-Andersen stratification data is under attack , and 
alternative measures of socialist welfare regimes do not reveal similar explanatory 
power. In the cross-sectional context, a measure of welfare state generosity 
(decommodification) looks promising for explaining foreign aid levels. On a 
theoretical level, the causal effect on people’s preferences should also follow from this 
variable. 
 
The effect of decommodification on foreign aid levels is further examined in a cross-
sectional time-series analysis. Here, the results are weaker and less stable. The most 
strict methodological procedures do not yield consistent results. Only when 
methodological requirements are eased slightly, a positive and significant effect 
becomes apparent. Common problems in time-series analysis (such as serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity) add further to a cautious interpretation of these 
results. An analysis of the theoretically less convincing level of social spending yields 
similar results. As a consequence, it cannot be said without reservation that 
universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions lead to higher foreign aid spending. 
 
The analysis of model 1 shows a surprising result: high decommodification levels and 
social spending have a negative effect on public support for foreign aid. This effect is 
only statistically significant for the original raw public opinion data, but the 
coefficients of the imputed data all have the same negative sign. Moreover, 
cumulative left power also has a statistically significant negative effect on public 
support for foreign aid in a number of models. 
 
These results are puzzling and completely contrary to what is expected from the 
theoretical framework. Data limitations prohibit robustness checks that are performed 
for the other models. More data is currently not available, but other statistical 
techniques may shed more light on this matter. If this result is found to be robust, this 
requires a thorough revision of the theoretical framework. 
 
Universalist (socialist) welfare state institutions do not seem to lead to higher public 
support for foreign aid. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. Although this result 
cannot be explained within our theoretical framework, it may shed light on why the 
results from model 0 are so weak. When discussing the research design, it was showed 
that the causal effects of model 1 and 2 are multiplicative, and that model 0 follows 
from the resulting vector. If welfare states do not have the theorised positive effect on 
public opinion, and the sign of the effect is negative or zero, they do not contribute to 
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the level of foreign aid as predicted. To verify this, we also need to look at the results 
of model 2. 
 
The analysis of model 2 shows that the raw Eurobarometer scores do not have an 
effect on foreign aid levels. When missing values are imputed with an OLS regression 
technique they exhibit a fairly robust and positive effect on foreign aid levels. When 
the last known values are used to fill the gaps in the sample, they do not demonstrate a 
stable effect on foreign aid levels. 
 
The positive effect from the OLS imputed values (opinion2) on foreign aid levels 
cannot be unified with the effect from welfare institutions on them. Neither 
decommodification nor social expenditures have a statistically significant effect on 
opinion2. On the other hand, decommodification and social expenditures have a 
statistically significant (negative) effect on the raw public opinion data. But the raw 
public opinion data does not have a statistically significant effect on foreign aid.  
 
When the different versions of the public opinion data are considered one at the time, 
the multiplicative effect of models 1 and 2 is zero. Even if we would be loose in our 
logical reasoning, the product of models 1 and 2 does not explain the (weak and 
unstable) effect of welfare states on foreign aid (model 0). When we multiply the 
negative effect of model 1 (raw public opinion data) with the positive effect of model 
2 (OLS imputed values) the result is still negative. 
 
In conclusion, the effect from welfare states on foreign aid spending is zero or 
positive. The effect from welfare states on public opinion is zero or negative. The 
effect from public opinion on foreign aid is zero or positive. Either version of the truth 
contradicts the theoretical framework. Higher foreign aid levels cannot be explained 
by the effect egalitarian welfare state institutions have on public opinion. These results 
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What are we to make of these results? Two simple possibilities present themselves. 
One possibility is that the data analysis is flawed. First, decommodification and social 
spending are only proxies for Esping-Anderson socialist scores. Second, the public 





regression models suffer from serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The data 
problem is acute, but there is no imminent solution. Better public opinion data do not 
exist at this moment in time. The validity of the Esping-Andersen socialist scores is 
under attack and the replicated scores are only available for two years. However, it is 
argued here that the decommodification data in this paper is a valid proxy that evades 
this problem. More sophisticated data analysis techniques may lead to different 
results. Other researchers are invited to do so. 
 
The second possibility is that the theoretical framework is flawed and needs to be 
reviewed. The hypothesised causal effects from welfare state institutions on foreign 
aid should be made more explicit and better thought through. Even if better public 
opinion data would be available, the direct link between public perceptions and policy 
is problematic. The democratic process is more complicated than this direct link 
assumes, and many additional factors may override the direct effect. Given these facts, 
the development of a better theoretical framework is the way forward in finding a 
definitive answer to the determinants of foreign aid. 
 
This paper gives a negative answer to the main question of this paper. It largely 
refutes one possible answer, leaving open many others. Nevertheless, a demonstration 
of what is not the case is also a contribution to the understanding of a subject. A small, 
but important step towards the escape out of the “intellectual vacuum” mentioned in 
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